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ABSTRACT
The conditioning in the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence has been defined (by
Shafer [15] as combination of a belief function and of an ”event” via Dempster rule. On
the other hand Shafer [15] gives a ”probabilistic” interpretation of a belief function (hence
indirectly its derivation from a sample). Given the fact that conditional probability dis-
tribution of a sample-derived probability distribution is a probability distribution derived
from a subsample (selected on the grounds of a conditioning event), the paper investigates
the empirical nature of the Dempster- rule of combination. It is demonstrated that the
so-called ”conditional” belief function is not a belief function given an event but rather a
belief function given manipulation of original empirical data.
Given this, an interpretation of belief function different from that of Shafer is proposed.
Algorithms for construction of belief networks from data are derived for this interpretation.
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1 Introduction
The Dempster-Shafer (DS) Theory (DST) or the Theory of Evidence [14], [3] is consid-
ered by many researchers as an appropriate tool to represent various aspects of human
dealing with uncertain knowledge, especially for representation of partial ignorance [17],
though this view has been challenged by various authors (compare the presentations and
discussions in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (IJAR), special issues in
Vol. 1990:4 No. 5/6 and Vol. 1992:6 No.3; see also [6], [4].
This paper is intended to shed some light onto the dispute over adequacy of the DST
from the technical point of view. The authors of this paper have been engaged in a project
having as its goal the implementation of an expert system dealing with uncertainty via
DST methodology mixed with the Bayesian approach [7]. Knowledge is represented by
a belief network to enable application of the reasoning system based on the work of
Shenoy and Shafer [16] (Shenoy-Shafer’s axiomatic framework encompasses both DST
and Bayesian-like reasoning scheme). It has been an ultimate goal of the developers of
that expert system to support also knowledge acquisition from data. Literature provides
with many methods of recovery of Bayesian belief network from data (and in certain cases
from additional appropriate hints of an expert), if the belief network should be a tree [1],
a polytree [13], or a general-type (usually sparse) network [2], [18]
As ”generalized probability” is a term frequently used to characterize the DS be-
lief function, it seems plausible to try to generalize Bayesian methods onto recovery of
Dempster-Shafer belief networks from data. However, as the above-mentioned discus-
sion in IJAR demonstrates, the relationship between empirical frequencies and DS belief
functions seems to be far from being clear.
We agree with Smets [17] that fundamental deviation of DST from any probabilistic
measure of uncertainty lies in the DS rule of combination (⊕) which serves as a way of
conditioning the overall DS distribution on some event (see [15]).
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In this paper we assume that DST notions like basic probability assignment or mass
function m, belief function Bel, pseudo-mass and pseudo-belief functions, combination ⊕,
marginalization ↓ and empty extension ↑ operations are well understood [14], [16].
2 Nature of Conditioning in DST
Let us consider for a moment how ”empirical” conditioning may be viewed in the proba-
bility theory. Let a probability distribution be defined as relative frequency over a (large)
population. Let us want to condition on an event, say {ω|α(ω)} where α is a predicate - a
logical expression in variables describing the population. Then we select all the objects ω
of the population which match the predicate α(ω) and the conditional distribution P (.|α)
will be the relative frequencies within this subpopulation.
Let us try to do the same with DS Bel’s. Following Shafer [15] we may be tempted
to interpret a valuation of an object ω of a population with a set A as a statement that
our variable of interest takes for this object one of the values mentioned in A, but we do
not know which one of them (and are not ready even to select any proper subset of A).
A will be treated as our most specific commitment to the value of the variable. Under
these circumstances, the basic probability assignment function m may be understood as
the probability distribution (read: relative frequencies) of such commitments within our
population. This is, in fact, the way as the ”generalized probability” in [6], or families of
probability distributions in [10] may be understood. Now let us go over to conditioning
on an event {ω|α(ω)} (after [15]). It is the beauty of the DST that there exists always a
set B that corresponds exactly to such an event. If BelB is the simple support function
capturing the evidence of the set B (that is mB(B) = 1, mB(A) = 0 for any A 6= B,
[15]) then by definition Bel(.|B) = Bel ⊕ BelB is the belief of Bel conditioned on the
event B [15]. But how does this definition ”run” on a population of objects ? It has
been demonstrated [8] that we can view it the following way: We take the predicate α
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and check the population object by object. Some of them deny the predicate. We reject
them as the frequentist model of conditional probability does. Some of them meet the
predicate - and we select them for our subpopulation - as conditional probability model
does. But there are some objects for which we are actually unable to decide whether they
meet the predicate or not (as our commitment is not specific enough). And what do we
have to do in this case to meet numerically the DS rule of combination ? We have to
accept them ! But (Alas!) this is not enough. We have to change our commitment -
we have to make our commitment for a particular object more specific so that it meets
the predicate α. So even if our commitment to the value of the attribute for this object
may have been correct prior to conditioning (that is the variable of interest took for the
object one of the values mentioned in the prior commitment), it may be not correct after
the conditioning. That is, after the conditioning we work with a subpopulation with
partially incorrect valuations (not corresponding with empirical reality), and we combine
evidence further ..... . (Classical!) probability theory does not do things like this - it
assumes that measuring sequence has no impact on the value of a variable (Of course,
there are several non-classical probability theories which took into account possibility
of disagreement between various observations if the sequence of making observations is
changed, but obviously most frequentist interpretations of DST didn’t consider them).
We feel that this (essentially numerical) argument explains most of apparent contra-
dictions derived from frequentist interpretations of the DST. But the DST will not be
helped with if left with the impression of telling us lies about the population (we have to
say, plausible lies, because by definition we are unable to check by observation if strength-
ening of a commitment for an object is in fact correct or not, because if we were able to
carry out such an observation then our prior commitment would have been more specific).
So instead of saying that the variable takes for the object one of the values in A, we could
say that the variable is set-valued and takes for the object all the values in A (this would
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be a kind of random set interpretation [11]). In this case conditioning could be viewed
as rejecting some of the values of the object which are not of interest. Then after condi-
tioning the object would have a commitment corresponding to the values it really takes,
though some other values were ignored as not of interest. However, this view would con-
tradict the usage of Bel’s to represent material implication P (ω)→ Q(ω) in form of a set
{(P (ω), Q(ω)), (¬P (ω), Q(ω)), (¬P (ω),¬Q(ω))} because it would lead to the impression
that at the same time P (ω) ∧Q(ω) and ¬P (ω) ∧ Q(ω) hold which is counterintuitive as
P (ω) ∧ ¬P (ω) = FALSE.
3 An Alternative View of DST
Hence an alternative view of DST is required. One has been developed in [8]. We present
it here informally. Instead of saying that the set A expresses that ”the variable of interest
takes one of the values in A” as well as instead of saying that the set A expresses that
”the variable of interest takes all of the values in A” a compromise is proposed: it is
assumed that the variable cannot be observed directly, but only via some measurement
procedure (with some special properties ensuring consistence), and the set A expresses
that ”the measurement procedure yielded TRUE when testing if X = ai (X - the variable
of interest) for all the ai ∈ A and for no ai 6∈ A”. If we make conditioning, the objects
are labeled, and the measurement method takes into account the labeling of objects by
refraining from carrying out tests on variable values outside of the label. In this way the
following is achieved:
• before and after every conditioning the interpretation of the commitment A is the
same for not rejected objects: ”the measurement procedure yielded TRUE when
testing if X = ai (X - the variable of interest) for all the ai ∈ A and for no ai 6∈ A”.
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• the impact of conditioning onto measurement results is taken into account - via
labeling
• any logical contradictions resulting from random set interpretation are avoided:
we do not say ”X takes the value” but that ”X has been measured to be”, and
contradictions resolve in imprecision of measurement method.
The importance of such an interpretation is not to be underestimated: a way is paved
towards experimental studies of populations with DS belief distributions.
To demonstrate this a development of a method of a tree/polytree factorization of a
joint DS belief distribution for purposes of Shenoy/Shafer uncertainty propagation [16] is
briefly outlined.
We define mk-conditional belief function BelX|Xi(A) as any pseudo-belief function solv-
ing the equation Bel = Bel↓Xi ⊕ BelX|Xi Notice, that in general this equation has no
unique solution, and a solution being a proper belief function does not always exist.
A DS Belief network be [9] a pair (D,Bel) where D is a dag (directed acyclic graph)
and Bel is a DS belief distribution called the underlying distribution. Each node i in D
corresponds to a variable Xi in Bel, a set of nodes I corresponds to a set of variables
XI and xi, xI denote values drawn from the domain of Xi and from the (cross product)
domain of XI respectively. Each node in the network is regarded as a storage cell for
any distribution Bel↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i) where Xpi(i) is a set of nodes corresponding to the
parent nodes pi(i) of i. The underlying distribution represented by a DS belief network is
computed via:
Bel =
n⊕
i=1
Bel↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i)
Let, after [5] I(J,K|L)D denote d-separation of J from K by L in a directed acyclic
graph D, where J,K and L are three disjoint sets of nodes in this dag D. We shall then
define [9]
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If XJ , XK , XL are three disjoint sets of variables of a distribution Bel, then XJ , XK
are said to be conditionally independent given XL (denoted I(XJ , XK |XL)Bel iff
Bel↓XJ∪XK∪XL|XL ⊕Bel↓XL = Bel↓XJ∪XL|XL ⊕ Bel↓XK∪XL|XL ⊕ Bel↓XL
I(XJ , XK |XL)Bel is called a (conditional independence) statement
THEOREM 1 [9] Let BelD = {Bel|(D,Bel) is a DS belief network}. Then:
I(J,K|L)D
iff
I(XJ , XK |XL)Bel
for all Bel ∈ BelD.
Many authors have connected causality with the notion of statistical dependence or
non-independence. We parallel here [18] in formulating the following principles, while
understanding independence as defined above
Let Vbe a set of random DS variables with a joint DS-belief distribution. We say that
variables X,Y ∈Vare directly causally dependent if and only if there is a causal dependency
between X,Y (either the value of X influences the value of Y or the value of Y influences
the value of X or the value of a third variable not in Vinfluences the values of both X and
Y) that does not involve any other variable in V.
Principle I: For all X,Y in V, X and Y are directly causally dependent if and only
if for every subset Sof Vnot containing X or Y, X and Y are not statistically independent
conditional on S.
We say that B is directly causally dependent on A provided that A and B are causally
dependent and the direction of causal influence is from A to B.
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Principle II: if A and B are directly causally dependent and B and C are directly
causally dependent, but A and C are not, then: B is causally dependent on A, and B is
causally dependent on C if and only if A and C are statistically dependent conditional on
any set of variables containing B and not containing A or C.
Principle III: A directed acyclic graph represents a DS-belief distribution on the
variables that are vertices of the graph if and only if
for all vertices X,Y and all sets Sof vertices in the graph (X,Y /∈ S), Sd-separates X and
Y if and only if X and Y are independent conditional on S.
THEOREM 2 [9] Let Bel be a DS-belief distribution represented by an acyclic directed
graph G according to Principle III. Then G is an orientation (G has the undirected struc-
ture) of the undirected graph U that represents Bel according to Principle I.
THEOREM 3 [9] Principle III implies Principle II.
THEOREM 4 [9] Let Γ be the set of directed graphs that represent DS-belief distribution
Bel according to Principle III. Then Γ is also the set of directed graphs obtained from P
by Principles I and II.
4 Belief Networks from Data under New Interpreta-
tion
Based on these purely theoretical considerations it was tried to develop some practical
algorithms for recovery of belief network structure from data for some limited classes of
belief networks. It was started with the most successful structures of Bayesian networks:
the tree and the polytree structures. In these efforts, corresponding Bayesian algorithms
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were exploited as general frameworks, though details had to be elaborated anew. It is
also worth mentioning, that, unlike in probabilistic case, a randomized generation of a
belief function possessing given belief network structure is not a trivial task due to the
data-changing nature of DS combination.
Let us present briefly these new algorithms:
The algorithm of Chow and Liu [1] for recovery of tree structure of a probability
distribution is well known and has been deeply investigated, so we will omit its description
in this paper. To accommodate it for the needs of DST one needs to introduce a definition
of distance between variables. Regrettably, no such definition having the nice properties of
the Chow and Liu exists, so a similar one has been elaborated: Let p be a mass function
and x be a pseudo-mass function. Let f(x; p) =
∑
A;p(A)>0 p(A) · ln x(A), where the
assumption is made that natural logarithm of a non-positive number is minus infinity. The
values of f in variable x with parameter p have range:(−∞, f(p; p)].Let g(x; p) = f(x;p)
f(p;p)
.The
values of g in variable x with parameter p range:[1,+∞).Let a(x; p) = e1−g(x;p). The values
of a in variable x with parameter p range:[0, 1]
By the ternary joint distribution of the variables X1, X2 with background X3 we un-
derstand the function:
m↓X1×X2[X3] =
= (m↓X1×X3|X3 ⊕m↓X2×X3|X3 ⊕m↓X3)↓X1×X2
By the distance (for use with Chow/Liu algorithm) DEP (X1, X2) we understand the
function:
DEP0DS(X1, X2) = 1−max(a(m
↓X1 ⊕m↓X2 ;m↓X1×X2), max
X3;X3∈V−X1,X2
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a(m↓X1×X2[X3];m↓X1×X2))
with V being the set of all variables.
For randomly generated tree-like DS belief distributions, if we were working directly
with these distributions, as expected, the algorithm yielded perfect decomposition into
the original tree. For random samples generated from such distributions, the structure
was recovered properly for reasonable sample sizes (200 for up to 8 variables). Recovery
of the joint distribution was not too perfect, as the space of possible value combination is
tremendous and probably quite large sample sizes would be necessary. It is worth men-
tioning, that even with some departures from truly tree structure a distribution could be
obtained which reasonable approximated the original one.
A well known algorithm for recovery of polytree from data for probability distributions
is that of Pearl [12], [13], we refrain from describing it here. To accommodate it for usage
with DS belief distributions we had to change the dependence criterion of two variables
given a third one.
Criterion(X1 → X3, X2 → X3) = (1− a(m
↓X1×X2[X3];m↓X1×X2))−
−(1− a(m↓X1 ⊕m↓X2 ;m↓X1×X2))
If the above function Criterion is positive, we assume head-to-head meeting of edges
X1, X3 and X2, X3. The rest of the algorithm runs as that of Pearl.
For randomly generated polytree-like DS belief distributions, if we were working di-
rectly with these distributions, as expected, the algorithm yielded perfect decomposition
into the original polytree. For random samples generated from such distributions, the
structure was recovered properly only for very large sample sizes (5000 for 6 variables),
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with growing sample sizes leading to spurious indications of head-to-head meetings not
present in the original distribution. Recovery of the joint distribution was also not too
perfect, due to immense size of space of possible value combinations.
Other distance and dependence measures than those mentioned above have been tried
but no clear winner could have been decided so far.
Though we are still far away from our goal of developing an efficient algorithm for
recovery of general DS belief network structure from empirical data, our efforts demon-
strated, that there exists at least one way of connecting the formalism of the Dempster-
Shafer Theory with frequencies from empirical data (though this may not be the one the
creators of this theory had in mind). At the same time our view of the nature of the
DS belief functions was shifted from traditional frequentist view to one with accepting
changing valuation of objects while running the conditioning process. This proved helpful
when comparing results of reasoning of the inference engine with the empirical distribu-
tion given by data.One of the consequences of this changing valuation of data during a
reasoning process is the crucial difference between probabilistic and DS belief networks: In
probabilistic networks the conditioning of a whole distribution on a set of variables has ex-
actly the same meaning as conditionality contained in a node of a network. That is, if the
variable Xn represented by a node n depends on the set of variables Xpi(n) then if we cal-
culate the conditional probability P (Xn|Xpi(n) on a whole network e.g. via Shenoy/Shafer
algorithm [16], then the result will be exactly the same as is the valuation attached to
the node n of the network. The situation is entirely different in case of DS networks:
the Shaferian Bel(Xn|Xpi(n)) calculated from the overall network is (and usually must be)
in general distinct from the valuation (mk-conditioning) Bel↓{Xn}∪Xpi(n)|Xpi(n) we attach to
a node of the network. Clearly, the Shenoy/Shafer uncertainty propagation algorithm
[16] is fully unaffected by the lack of identity between these two notions of conditioning,
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and in fact a node valuation neither in probabilistic nor in DS case is required to have
anything to do with any notion of conditionality. But attachment of conditionality to a
node of a belief network is important for understanding the contents of a belief network
which was invented as a means of representing causal dependencies [18]. Our notion of
mk-conditionality Bel↓{Xn}∪Xpi(n)|Xpi(n) gives a node in a DS belief network a local meaning:
it can be estimated from data using only variables engaged, that is {Xn}∪Xpi(n). Notably,
this does not hold for the general view of belief networks (that is without reference to
conditionality) presented by Shenoy and Shafer [16].To verify the validity of valuation of
any node of a general form hypertree considered in [16] one may be forced to consider the
entire hypertree at once.
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